In this study we analyze the evolution of ownership, control, and performance of German founding-family-owned firms over the last century. We begin by identifying German family-owned stock companies that were founded before 1913 and still in existence in 2003 with sales turnover of more than 50 million Euro. Then we construct a matching sample of non-family-owned German stock companies in 2003. The resulting full sample consists of 62 Family and 62 Non-Family Firms in 2003. We go back a century and identify all firms, for which we are able to collect data for the whole period. Then we compare family-owned vs. non-family-owned firms over the 100-year time-span, analyzing a variety of variables like ownership, control, industries, bank relationship s and performance, as well as the impact of intergenerational control transfers. We find that families give up ownership slowly and control of fa mily businesses remains strong even after several generations. Family bus inesses seem to outperform non-family firms in terms of operating (but not stock) performance, but grow more slowly, and performance decreases through time.
INTRODUCTION
In the years leading up to World War I, German equity markets were among the most highly developed in the world. Although today there are only about 750 companies listed on German stock exchanges, in 1914 there were almost 1,200 (as compared to only about 600 stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange), and there was an active underwriting market with 300 IPOs from 1905 to 1914 (Eube 1998 Goetzmann et al. 2001) . But after World War II, the role of the equity markets in funding corporate growth was largely taken over by the German "universal banks." Measured in terms of total market capitalization, the German stock market is now only number five in the world, which seems unimpressive when the size of the German economy is taken into account. However, another characteristic pattern has been more stable through both World Wars, namely the prevalence of family-owned firms in the German economy.
In 2003, nearly 700 large German companies that were founded in or before 1913 existed with a sales turnover of more than 50 million Euro. 1 Of these comp anies 159 can be classified as stock companies (Aktiengesellschaften), of which 62 still continue to be owned and operated by descendents of the founding family. 2 Furthe rmore, there is concentrated family ownership in a large share of the century-old large non-stock firms owned by families. The descendants of the founders still own the controlling stake in 60 percent of these firms and control the board in 84 percent of the cases. Thus even today, Germany still has powerful families.
In comparison to Anglo-Saxon countries, family-ownership seems to be more widespread, persistent, and successful in Germany. It seems that German families had a better chance to inherit and transfer controlling stakes to successive generations while staying on an expansion path and sustaining firm performance. Bjuggren and Sund (2002) show that inheritance tax laws act as crucial constraints that foster intergenerational transition of ownership in family firms. Thus, one possible explanation for strong family ownership may be that inheritance taxation of corporate estates in Germany has always been low in comparison to international standards. A comparative study of the Japanese Ministry of Finance (2004) shows that Germany has both the lowest inheritance tax rates as well as the highest tax-exempt thresholds among the five biggest economies in the world (Appendix I). 3 Contrasting this with the scarce empirical evidence and mixed evidence for other countries, we want to shed some light on the evolution of ownership, control, and performance of German fa mily-owned firms over the last century.
In our paper we want to find empirical answers to the question: What does the evolution of some of the largest and oldest companies in Germany look like? Our central research topic is the relationship between family ownership, family control, and firm performance. Related questions arising are: By whom and in which industries were they established and where and when did families sell their companies?
What is the evolution of family control (CEOs, board membership) in the postfounder ge nerations? Furthermore, we want to know how founding-family ownership and generational succession correspond to corporate performance (operating, stock returns, growth).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section B reviews the related literature and predictions of analytical studies, shows comparable results of similar performance studies, and derives testable hypotheses. In section C1 we explain how we construct our sample, and discuss limitations of our study with respect to data availability. Section C2 clarifies how we define performance and other variables. The tables discussed in section D document our results. In particular, section D1 is on the evolution of ownership and control; section D2 covers industry distribution and control transfers; and section D3 deals with the impact of family owne rship on performance and growth. In Section E we draw conclusions of our study.
B RELATED LITERATURE

B1 Evolution of Family Business
Recent research documents a strikingly high concentration of ownership around the world, primarily held by families. Based on ownership structures of companies from the richest 27 countries, La Porta et al. (1999) show that families control 30 percent of the top 20 firms. For medium-sized firms, family control is more common in countries with poor shareholder protection (50 vs. 39 percent) and with a civil-law 3 The study comparing Japan, U.S.A., U.K., Germany, and France can be found at -4tradition. According to Faccio and Lang (2002) 's (2004ab) finding that family ownership in Britain was rapidly diluted in the twentieth century.
In contrast to the U.K. and the U.S., it is less likely that control transfers in German family firms are the result of (hostile) takeovers. However, Franks and Mayer (2001) and Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that an active market in share blocks and accumulation of 'hostile stakes' also enables control changes and acts as a substitute for an Anglo-Saxon style market for corporate control. Our research shows that 66 percent of German large-scale enterprises, which were founded in or before 1913 and are still in existence in 2003, are family-owned firms. As these results indicate, inherited control is more common in Germany than in countries like the U.K. or the U.S.
In line with the theoretical predictions of Zingales (1995) and Bebchuk (1999) , Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003) show that German family owners tend to either manifest controlling shareholder structures or sell their controlling stakes completely and exit. Other theoretical models, such as Bhattacharya and Ravik umar (2001, 2002) and Burkart et al. (2003) , also predict cross-country differences in the evolution of family ownership. The salient finding in Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001) is that market imperfections influence the decision of the incumbent family owners either to bequeath the controlling stake (and the business skills), or to sell the business and to bequeath the proceeds. Therefore, family businesses should be bigger, last longer, and have lower investment rates in countries with less developed capital markets. Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2002) focus on the succession in family firms by analyzing the trade-off between hiring a family member (with aligned incentives) and
hiring a more qualified outside professional (with non-aligned incentives). In that principal-agent framework, family firms can professionalize their management only after reaching a critical firm size. Burkart et al. (2003) report that the quality of minority shareholder protection in a given country affects the evolution of family firms.
They predict firms with diffuse stock ownership and professional managers to be www.mof.go.jp/english/zei/report2/zc001f06.htm . prevalent only in countries that have established a high quality corporate governance environment. In an intermediate shareholder protection environment, the management is delegated to a professional and the family acts as a controlling shareholder to monitor the management. In legal regimes with weak protection there is no separation of ownership and control because of the high level of agency costs. These theoretical models of the evolution of family businesses are consistent with the existence of a variety of corporate governance designs that change through time and differ between firms and legal systems.
In the following section, we discuss empirical evidence on the performance of family firms in North America, and on corporate governance structures that several generations of family members in different countries have adopted through time.
B2
Family ownership and performance in North-America and Asia
Although family ownership is essential in most countries, so far there are only a few studies that look at the performance of family firms empirically. In analyzing the long-run impact of family ownership on firm performance the question that jumps to the forefront is what motivates families to concentrate much of their wealth in one (single undiversified) firm? Do they have superior management or monitoring abilities as compared to other types of shareholders? This can be considered by looking at whether family-owed firm actually achieve superior long-run performance through successive generations. If this is the case, then from the perspective of minority shareholders it is important to know, if management and control mechanisms potentially wipe out the family's incentives to enjoy private benefits of control.
Some studies examine the impact of some forms of family management and control on firm value, the most recent ones being related to management successions within family firms and possible inefficient control transfers through inheritance.
McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001) find some evidence that founding family firms have greater value, are operated more efficiently, and carry less debt than nonfamily firms in the US. They suggest that "it is the family control of the firm rather than management ownership that is the key to the diffe rences". McConaughy and Phillips (1999) look at 147 public family firms in the U.S. and find that founder--6controlled firms grow faster and invest more than descendent-controlled firms, but are less profitable than firms in the second and later generations.
Amoaku-Adu and Smith (1999) and Pérez-Gonzalez (2002) report that family firms experience declines in performance when family successions are appointed. For Canada, Amoaku-Adu and Smith (1999) find that "the negative stock market reaction to family successors is related to their relatively young age than their family connection per se." They further show some evidence that poor performance influences the family's decision of management succession. In the case of poor corporate performance it is more likely that the family hires a non-family insider or outsider than a fa mily member. Pérez-Gonzalez (2002) looks at successions in family firms in the U.S. and observes a negative impact on performance, which, however, is not evident in firms where the promoted CEO is unrelated to the controlling family. He interprets his findings as evidence that "nepotism hurts firms' performance by limiting the scope of labour market competition."
On the contrary, Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue that family firms perform better than non-family firms in the US. Based on operating performance, family ownership creates value when the founder or founder-descendants are active as CEO.
However, both the presence of the founder CEO and a hired outside CEO have a positive effect on market performance. Contrary to the operating performance results, however, founder descendants seem not to affect the stock market performance.
Villalonga and Amit (2004) find that family management creates value as long as the founder serves as the CEO, or as its chairman with a hired non-family CEO.
Contrarily to Anderson and Reeb (2003) , they find that firm value as measured by For the case of Thai business families, Bertrand at al. (2004) show that large families perform worse than small families and that the presence of the founder is important for performance. They also find a positive relationship between family size and involvement of family members in the business group, especially when the ult imate control has passed from the founder to one of his descendants. The authors conclude that part of the decay in family-run groups over time may be due to infighting for group resources as control becomes more diluted among different family me mbers.
Summarizing, so far the international evidence on the relation between family control and firm performance is mixed and inconclusive, but transferring control to a successive generation seems to have an important impact. Let us now take a look at Germany where management succession by family members is quite common.
B3 Hypothesis Development
In a standard corporate finance set-up the founding family maximizes the combined value of the firm as a source of security benefits (cash flows, income) and as a source of private benefits (amenities, reputation). Since g rowth of the company requires access to outside capital, the family faces a trade off between an increase in income (maximization of the value of cash flow rights) and the cost of giving up control (and losing utility from expropriation of private benefits). Therefore, it can be assumed that family firms try to maintain control while growing the firm at the same time.
Suppose that families trade in income from marginal projects financed with external capital for private benefits from retaining control by reducing investment.
Then this would lead to the following testable implications:
Hypothesis 1: Ownership stakes of families (1a) do not decrease through generations over time; and (1b) are concentrated at critical stakes (50 percent, 75 percent).
internally (as in high-technology industries).
Hypothesis 3: Family firms are more profitable than non-family firms.
Hypothesis 4: Performance of family firms decreases over generations.
Hypothesis 5: Family firms sacrifice growth in order to retain control, i.e., nonfamily firms grow faster than family firms.
C SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY
C1 Data
In our study we apply a backward approach of sample selection, not only accepting, but also indeed imposing a high survivorship requirement. We start by identifying all German family-owned stock companies founded before 1913 and still in existence in 2003 with sales turnover of more than 50 million Euro. Companies are categorized as a large company (Großunternehmen) when they employ more than 250 people and generate turnover of more than 50 Mio Euro. 4 We are well aware that the design of our sample selection considerably reduces cross-sectional variation in the data, which biases against finding statistical significance in our tests. However, empirical evidence shows that family firms on average have a higher probability of survival through time than non-family firms. 5 Consequently, since our sample design assumes the survival probabilities of both types of firms to be equal, our results will even underestimate the true performance of family-firms relative to non-family-firms.
The data are assembled manually from the following sources found in archives and different libraries in Frankfurt and Berlin: Our main data source are the Hoppenstedt yearbooks, which include the annual reports, and list the name of the directors, supervisory board, voting rights, connection with banks, industry, nominal equity capital, earnings, total book assets, turnover, etc. Particularly in earlier vo lumes, sometimes the data of the year is incomplete and several variables are missing.
Reasons for this are changes in the critical size of companies and/or the companies' names, or non-existing requirements for stock companies to disclose information (like ownership structure) in the early years of the last century. Because of limited data availability in earlier volumes of the Hoppenstedt Databases 6 the number of available firms differs depending on the investigation period and the type of analysis.
Further details of the firms and their founding families could be found in the annual reports of the companies or in reports on the corporate history. Furthermore, individual research with newspaper and/or corporate a rchives has been done to document if a company is a family or non-family-owned firm. Finally, in order to verify and interpret our findings, we have conducted interviews with numerous ind ividuals who are members of the founding family and active or former board representatives.
Our definition of family firm is restrictive in comparison to others in the literature. For example, Franks et al. (2004), Anderson and Reeb (2003) as well as
Villalonga and Amit (2004) define as family-owned any firm where family ownership is greater than zero. 7 We define a firm as family-owned only when there is a dominant influence of the founding family documented by a voting rights concentration of more than 50 percent. 8 Under this definition, participation of family members in management is not essential for being classified as family-owned. More relevant is the fa mily's potential to lead all strategic decisions through voting rights. In Germany, corporate power culminates in the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), whose members are elected by the shareholders. We trace founding family ownership from incorporation up until the family looses controlling influence, i.e., when their voting rights are less than 50 percent.
From the approximately 700 German companies that were founded before 1913, and were still in existence in 2003, we have compiled a family firm sample of 62 listed stock companies. We then constructed a matching sample of German stock companies that were not family-owned in 2003 and which were also founded before 1913 (see Table 1a ). [Insert Table 2 about here]
We also analyze control transfers that happened through the sale of family stakes to new owners. To define family control we considered the participation of the founding family on the supervisory board and/or the board of directors. Because of limited data availability, our operating performance variable is the return on assets.
We further look at stock market performance for several sub-samples. To find out more about size effects in family firms we look at the evolution of sales turnover and nominal capital. Also, to investigate information about financing constraints of fa mily vs. non-family firms, we calculate the number and regional distrib ution of bank relationships.
Finally, in order to support our results and get meaningful interpretations of the data, we conduct i nterviews with members of some of the family firms in our sample. This survey is used to widen evidence and shed further light on the real issues of control and performance. The interviews are not statistically analyzed and most interviewees prefer to stay anonymous, but among them are members of prominent industrial families like, for example, Gütermann, Henkel, Merck, Schlenk, Wacker. We separate family ownership into (i) majority control with more than 50 percent, and (ii) supermajority control with more than 75 percent of voting rights. Table   3b shows family ownership and board participation for the three time periods, as well as the cohort of the post-founder generation that effectively controls the firm. Still, even 100 years following our first investigation period, there is supermajority control of the founding family in many firms. Table 3b shows that 72 percent of the German family-owned firms are still controlled by a supermajority of the founding family in 2003 (Period III). In 1963 (Period II) the founding families owned in 87 percent of the cases a supermajority (more than 75 percent of the voting rights) of the company. Table 2 ). For example, in one of the still existing firms, Carl Schlenk, only family members control both the CEO and the supervisory board over a hundred years.
D RESULTS
D1 Evolution of Family Ownership and Family Control
In German family-owned stock companies we see during all time periods a very low separation of ownership and control. In 1913 there is no family firm without a family member as an executive and/or member of the supervisory board. 9 One reason is probably the intense family involvement during the founding stage of most firms of the sample. In the second period after World War II, there is an increased number of family firms with a separation of ownership and control. However, we interpret this as a result of soldiers dying in combat, taken as prisoners of war and the denazification process of family firms. Still, in 1963, we find that in 87 percent of the cases the supermajority of voting rights is in the hand of the founding family. In 2003 the number of family firms with no family control in the management is again small with only seven percent.
Overall, German founding families keep a tight grip on the control of their firms over the whole century, which corresponds to their large ownerships stakes.
They even rebound in the last period in terms of board representation, following the short decline after WWII. We can therefore support verification of Hypothesis 1a but not necessarily Hypothesis 1b, since most ownership stakes lie above the critical thresholds. Thus, founding families hold more voting rights than they would need at any given level of control.
D2
Industry distribution and control transfers
We sort the firms in the sample by industry categories using Fama-French's 12industry definitions, and further partition the sample based on the BE/ME ratio into technology intensive (bottom quartile) vs. less technology intensive firms. 10 Table 4 gives some indication that many family-owned firms sold their firms after the sixties. Both the foundation of family businesses and subsequent transfers of control seem to be concentrated in certain industries. Throughout the whole century, family firms are less prevalent in technology-intensive industries. Family firms mostly operate in less technology-intensive industries (see Table 4 ). The industries
where the founding families are most likely to sell control are business equipment (67 percent), chemical products (63 percent), and healthcare (60 percent ). These industries can be assumed to be more capital-intensive than the others, which is possibly a reason for the exit of the founding family. Thus, in industries, where outside capital is needed to further expand the business, exit can be seen as an alternative to keeping family control. Over all industries, 38 percent of the family firms changed owners during the century.
[Insert Table 4 about here] mens (4 percent). Except fort he latter case this does not s eem violate to representativeness of ownership. 10 The 12-Industry classification using Fama-French definitions: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french. We exclude industries eight (utilities) and eleven (finance).
We can therefore confirm the valid ity of Hypothesis 2 that family firms only give up ownership in capital-intense industries, which are for the most part hightechnology industries. Since ownership and control remains so concentrated in Germany, let us look at possible implications for the performance of firms.
D3
The impact of family ownership on performance and growth
D3.1 Family vs. non-family firms performance
The evidence in other countries suggests that strong family control can be (potentially) detrimental to firm performance (Pérez-Go nzales 2004 ).
In conducting our empirical analysis, we investigate firm performance by looking at both operating and stock performance. We begin our analysis by using the return on assets for the years 1903 until 2003 to document the operating performance of family firms vs. non-family firms. However, we have to take into account that we can only compare surviving family firms vs. surviving non-family firms, a problem which similar studies face as well. If the decision to stay or give up the status as a family firm has an impact on the likelihood of survival (or default) the results would be biased accordingly (most likely in the direction of underestimating the true performance of family firms who supposedly have a higher survival probability). Table 6a shows the operating performance results for our German sample.
Calculations are based on financial reports compiled by the Hoppenstedt Aktie nführer which contain detailed accounting info rmation. The most striking feature of the table is that family firms seem to perform significant ly better than non-family firms with statistical significance at the one percent level. In all periods -except for 1903 -it looks like the operating family firms performance is better than that of non-family firms. That is, the all period average (median) return on assets is 16.9 percent (3.8 percent) versus 7.5 percent (2.3 percent), respectively. Age seems to have a negative impact on performance, whereas other proxies like technology intensity, bank relatio nships, or l ocation in a small town turn out to be irrelevant. This is evidence in support of Hypothesis 3 that family firms are more profitable.
[Insert [Insert Table 5b about here]
In sum, we use a variety of different measures for corporate performance. We are aware that results ha ve to be taken with caution, but at least they do not show any support for an underperformance of long-term survival family firms. Although fa mily firms seem to have a better operating performance, minority shareholders cannot take advantage of this in terms of abnormal stock returns by buying and holding a portfolio consisting of these family firms. This pattern of superior operating performance without a corresponding abnormal stock performance of family firms is also found in the study by Anderson and Reeb (2003) . In sum, our analysis fails to find a significant relationship that ownership matters for the performance in longterm listed survival firms.
D3.2 Intergenerational control transfers and firm performance
points to underperformance due to inefficient allocation of human resources because of family control and within-family succession of management positions. In line with this spirit we want to identify generational effects that may have an influence on firm performance. In this investigation we define the beginning of the second generation as the point in time when the founder transfers the operational control of the firm to members of his immediate family -usually the children or siblings. The second ge neration keeps control until it transfers it to the founders' grandchildren and so on. A generation is thus counted each time a part of the founding family transfers the right to exercise control to the next family member. We receive i nformation about the number of generations from the firms' history reports and individual research in the Hoppenstedt Database or newspapers as well as through corporate archives. Table 6a shows the number of generations running the family firm. Except for 1913, the firms are running in the post-founder generations. In our sample we analyse the impact of inherited control, and differentiate whether the firm is owned by the second, third, fourth, or fifth (and above) generation. To understand the evolution of ownership and control in G erman firms, it seems to be an i nteresting fact that mostly the post-founder generations, and particularly the third generation, are selling parts of the firms or exit completely (see Table 6a ). But as wee can see in Table 6a , even some owners within the founder generation were going public (11 percent of the cases).
[Insert Table 6a about here]
To investiga te the generational impact we define performance as follows:
First we measure the abnormal operating performance as the difference between the operating performance of the family firm and the operating performance of a matching portfolio of non-family firms. The matching portfolio contains all sample nonfamily firms in the same year. Finally, we aggregate the calculated abnormal operating performance for each generation. Therefore we construct this equation: Our performance measure is therefore a measure of normalized overperformance of non-family firms. When we separate the different post-founder ge nerations from each other and access the performance delivered by each generation, we find a performance gap in the third generation. In the founder generation there is a strong performance, and in the second generation a particularly stronger performance -which the third and fourth generations do not maintain. After the founder passes control to the second generation, the y increase the performance by 8.6 percent. After the second ge neration, the third generation reduces the performance by 11.5 percent.
The fourth and following generations perform slightly better than the third. However, we are not sure at the moment if this investigation shows a clear trend. In the entrepreneurship literature the second and third generations are often assumed to be confronted with conflicts about leading the company (Davis and Harveston, 1999, 2001; Sonfield and Lussier, 2004) . In line with this, many exits of family members take place especially in this generation (see Table 6a ). A family exit might reduce the firms' performance due to the high number of exit-expenses.
[Insert Table 6b about here] However, we are unable to control for other individual determinants of firm performance in each family firm and industry. Therefore, from this simple analysis we cannot claim to make a clear statement about the causes of these performance diffe rences and their relation to possible 'inefficient inheritance of control' effects. In a further step to expand the above analysis we regress operating performance on ge nerations and a set of various control variables. Among all of the typical factors used to explain variation in firm performance, generations are the only variable that has a significantly (negative) impact, which for the most part supports the result from the fo rmer analysis. However, when we also control for age in the regression model, the generation effect seems to be absorbed by the (almost significant at the 10 percent level) age variable. Thus, the decreasing impact of successive generations on performance appears to be nothing more then an age effect reflecting changing performance patterns in the life-cycle of the firm. Therefore we have to reject Hypothesis 4 that performance of family firms is a decreasing function of the generation running the firm.
[Insert Table 6c about here]
D3.3 Growth Patterns in Family vs. Non-Family Firms
As Fohlin (2004) points out: "German corporations generally performed well, but perhaps not as remarkably in terms of growth rates and profitability as one might imagine given the growth of the overall economy at the time". In particular, family firms experienced remarkably slow growth -measured by sales or nominal capitalas compared to non-family firms during the 20 th Century. Consequently, in Table 7 we see higher sales turnover for non-family firms. The all period average of family firm sales amount to 1,374 million Deutsche Mark (702 million Euro) versus a nonfamily firm turnover of 11,064 million Deutsche Mark (5,656 million Euro). Remarkable is the stronger increase of non-family firms' turnover after 1965.
For the fourteen sample firms with complete panel data, we see that former family firms like Daimler-Benz, Siemens and Buderus have strong turnover growth.
In these firms, non-family members contributed to the nominal equity capital through outside financing. Therefore, a possible reason for the smaller growth in size of the family firms could be the limited opportunity to finance through nominal equity capital. A confirming indicator for this 'financial constraints hypothesis' is the small size of nominal equity capital that family firms have compared to non-family-owned firms. Table 7 reports an average nominal capital of 56 million Deutsche Mark (29 million Euro) in family firms versus 187 million Deutsche Mark (96 million Euro).
[Insert Table 7 about here]
The average or median number of relationships with banks could give some further explanations for the lower growth in sales and equity capital for family-owned firms. As can be seen in Table 8 , family-owned firms have, on average, 2.9 (median 3.0) connections with bank s, as compared to the 4.0 (mean and median) connections -19with banks for non-family-owned firms. Over time, family-owned firms decrease the average number of bank relationships. The geographical dispersion of banks gives further information on the importance of banks for the financing of the firm.
[Insert Table 8 about here] Table 8 also investigates whether the sample firms have nationwide (vs. only regional) connections to banks. The idea here is that nationwide connections to banks are an indicator of the quality of financing relationships (main German banks are situated in Berlin, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Stuttgart and Munich) and of the financial independence from the Hausbank in town. However, Table 8 reports no evident differences between family-and non-family firms in this respect. So while bank relationships may be an important factor of corporate growth, we fail to verify this in a statistically significant way.
In sum, we cannot therefore reject but also cannot verify without doubt Hypothesis 5 saying that family firms sacrifice growth in order to retain control and grow less than non-family firms.
E CONCLUSION
In Germany, families have been exerting power in family-owned corporations with more persistence compared to other countries. Today's founding successors still own and control their firms. Thereby they seem to prefer family ownership to stronger corporate growth, but in terms of operating performance they have not been performing worse (but rather better) than those firms that left the family path. Compared to Anglo-Saxon countries, the still small number of stock companies (and high number of private family firms), together with the high concentration of family ownership, constitutes an unchanged fact about the German capital markets.
In a nutshell, our research shows that German f amilies give up ownership slowly and sometimes not at all, and control of family businesses remains strong even after several generations. Family businesses outperform non-family firms in terms of operating performance not in terms of stock market performance, but they also grow more slowly. The succession of ownership and control to subsequent generations seems not to have an adverse impact on performance, except for a general decline in profitability along the life-cycle of the firm.
decisions. At the start of the last century, families could exercise control over extended periods as directors of their firms. The same firms keep the same control today and perform reasonably well according to the numbers. There are also private benefits for entrepreneurial families, such as a good reputation resulting not only from good management performance but also from philanthropic activities of their companies, when the families think of themselves as having a social responsibility.
Therefore, we come to the conclusion that firms running in the family, almost one hundred years after their foundation, still look very much like the firms they used to be and fare quite well in Germany. Sources: Hoppenstedt and Saling Aktienführer (1903 -2003 ), Handbuch der Deutschen Großunternehmen (1953 -2003 
Difference FF/NFF
The table shows the descriptive data of 62 family and 62 non-family firms founded before 1913 and still in existance. Age is measured in years, and size of the turnover of 2003 in hundred thousand Deutsch Mark. Small town is when the corporate headquarter is located in a small town as defined by the German Federal Office (Bundesamt) for Statistics as not being 'Großstädte or 'Millionenstädte' (large towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants). Technology intensive industries are defined according to Fama and French (1985) as Business Equipment, Healthcare and Chemical Products (details see Table 4 ). Statistical significance is reported at usual levels (*10%, **5%, ***1%) levels. The z-value is measured by the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Withney) test or two sample test of proportion. P-values are in brackets. 
Number Listed Companies
The table compares monthly returns of 35 companies, listed on Amtlicher Handel Frankfurt from February 1947 until December 1995 (587 equally-weighted monthly portfolio returns using 13,377 firm-month observations). The all period average shows that family fims perform not significantly different from non-family firms. Further analysis shows that there is a slightly better performance of 0,0013 percent of non-family firms (not statistically significant at usual *10%, **5%, ***1% levels). The generation is identified through changes of family CEO or board members. In some cases, the exact generation is identified or cross-checked by information received from the companies' investor relations department, firm history reports or individual newspaper research (e.g., Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung). The table shows the number of family firms going public in relation to the generation.
III
Generation selling partial control of the Family Firm
Generation Going Public (IPO)
Generation running the Family Firm 4'482'655 585'471 1'409'752 415'667 10'706'360 1'128'617 222'492 118'810 21'885'976 744'858 
All Firms Family Firms Family Firm Non-Family Firm Non-Family Firms
Sales Turnover (Size 1) Nominal Capital (Size 2) "Final 14" "Final 14" 
All Firms Family Firms Non-Family Firms Family Firms Non-Family Firms
